The SEBI Board in its meeting on June 24, 2002 considered some important issues relating to the derivative markets including:

• Physical settlement of stock options and stock futures contracts.
• Review of the eligibility criteria of stocks on which derivative products are permitted.
• Use of sub-brokers in the derivative markets.
• Norms for use of derivatives by mutual funds

The recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Derivatives on some of these issues were also placed before the SEBI Board. The Board desired that these issues be reconsidered by the Advisory Committee on Derivatives (ACD) and requested a detailed report on the aforesaid issues for the consideration of the Board.

In the meantime, several other important issues like the issue of minimum contract size, the segregation of the cash and derivative segments of the exchange and the surveillance issues in the derivatives market were also placed before the ACD for its consideration.

The Advisory Committee therefore decided to take this opportunity to present a comprehensive report on the development and regulation of derivative markets including a review of the recommendations of the L. C. Gupta Committee (LCGC).

Four years have elapsed since the LCGC Report of March 1998. During this period therehave been several significant changes in the structure of the Indian Capital Markets which include, dematerialisation of shares, rolling settlement on a T+3 basis, client level and Value at Risk (VaR) based margining in both the derivative and cash markets and proposed demutualization of Exchanges. Equity derivative markets have now been in existence for two years and the markets have grown in size and diversity of products.This therefore appears to be an appropriate time for a comprehensive review of the development and regulation of derivative markets.

The LCGC outlined the goals of regulation admirably well in Paragraph 3.1 of its report.We endorse these regulatory principles completely and base our recommendations also on these same principles. We therefore reproduce this paragraph of the LCGC Report:

"The Committee believes that regulation should be designed to achieve specific, well-defined goals. It is inclined towards positive regulation designed to encourage healthy activity and behaviour. It has been guided by the following objectives:

(a) Investor Protection: Attention needs to be given to the following four aspects:

(i) Fairness and Transparency: The trading rules should ensure that trading is conducted in a fair and transparent manner. Experience in other countries shows that in many cases, derivatives brokers/dealers failed to disclose potential risk to the clients. In this context, sales practices adopted by dealers for derivatives would require specific regulation. In some of the most widely reported mishaps in the derivatives market elsewhere, the underlying reason was inadequate internal control system at the user-firm itself so that overall exposure was not controlled and the use of derivatives was for speculation rather than for risk hedging. These experiences provide useful lessons for us for designing regulations.

(ii) Safeguard for clients’ moneys: Moneys and securities deposited by clients with the trading members should not only be kept in a separate clients’ account but should also not be attachable for meeting the broker’s own debts. It should be ensured that trading by dealers on own account is totally segregated from that for clients. 

(iii) Competent and honest service: The eligibility criteria for trading members should be designed to encourage competent and qualified personnel so that investors/clients are served well. This makes it necessary to prescribe qualification for derivatives brokers/dealers and the sales persons appointed by them in terms of a knowledge base. 

(iv) Market integrity: The trading system should ensure that the market’s integrity is safeguarded by minimising the possibility of defaults. This requires framing appropriate rules about capital adequacy, margins, clearing corporation, etc.

(b) Quality of markets: The concept of "Quality of Markets" goes well beyond market integrity and aims at enhancing important market qualities, such as cost-efficiency, price-continuity, and price-discovery. This is a much broader objective than market integrity.

(c) Innovation: While curbing any undesirable tendencies, the regulatory framework should not stifle innovation which is the source of all economic progress, more so because financial derivatives represent a new rapidly developing area, aided by advancements in information technology."

The LCGC stated in Paragraph 1.24:

"There are inter-connections among the various kinds of financial futures, mentioned above [equity, interest rate and currency], because the various financial markets are closely inter-linked, as the recent financial market turmoil in East and South-East Asian countries has shown. The basic principles underlying the running of futures markets and their regulation are the same. Having a common trading infrastructure will have important advantages. The Committee, therefore, feels that the attempt should be to develop an integrated market structure." We agree with this assessment. Currently, in the country, there is a vibrant currency forward market, and negligible activity in currency options and in interest-rate derivatives. These markets are non-transparent telephone markets. We now have the institutions and technology at hand, to bring these markets onto the transparent exchange platform. This would bring the advantages of price-time priority, transparency, risk management at a central counterparty, nationwide reach, etc. to these important markets. Hence, SEBI and RBI should move on with trading in futures, options and swaps using a variety of underlyings, such as (a) the INR-USD rate, (b) the short-end interest rate, (c) the long-end interest rate, (d) MIBOR, etc.

The LCGC advocated a phased introduction of different equity derivatives in India in Paragraph 2.17 of its report:

"The consensus in the Committee was that stock index futures would be the best starting point for equity derivatives in India. The Committee has arrived at this conclusion after careful examination of all aspects of the problem, including the survey findings and regulatory preparedness. The Committee would favour the introduction of other types of equity derivatives also, as the derivatives market grows and the market players acquire familiarity with its operations. Other equity derivatives include options on stock index or on individual stocks. There may also be room for more than one stock index futures. It is bound to be a gradual process, shaped by market forces under the over-all supervision of SEBI."

This phased approach was adopted in India with index futures being introduced in June 2000, index options in June 2001 and individual stock options in July 2001.

The LCGC was not much inclined towards the fourth type of equity derivatives (individual stock futures) given its then limited popularity globally:

"The fourth type, viz. individual stock futures, was favoured much less. It is pertinent to note that the U.S.A. does not permit individual stock futures. Only one or two countries in the world are known to have futures on individual stocks."

(Paragraph 2.3)

Since the time of the LCGC report, the world has changed a great deal. Towards the end of 2000, the United States passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act that demarcated the jurisdiction of the CFTC and the SEC and thereby removed the regulatory obstacle to single stock futures in that country. Single stock futures are expected to start trading in the United States later this year with the major derivatives exchanges coming together in a joint venture (OneChicago) for this purpose and Nasdaq teaming up with Liffe in a rival alliance. The list of countries trading single stock futures has expanded substantially during 2001 to include the United Kingdom, Greece, Mexico, Canada,

Singapore, Hong Kong, Netherlands, Spain, Australia, Sweden, Finland, Denmark,Portugal, Hungary and South Africa. Liffe in London trades single stock futures on a range of stocks from around the world including the United States.

In India, the regulatory debate on single stock futures intensified when SEBI started work in early 2000 on adapting the carry-forward system to the rolling settlement regime. A dissent note in the report of the committee appointed for this purpose recommended that carry forward system should be swiftly replaced by single stock futures.

"The weekly carry forward system under rolling settlements is conceptually very close to a futures contract on individual stocks with five different futures contracts (with maturities of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 trading days) open for trading on any day. Moreover, the risk management of a proper futures contract is much better understood. As such, Dr. Patil and Prof. Varma recommend that the weekly carry forward product should swiftly migrate to a full fledged futures contract in individual stocks. When this is done, the product will cease to be regulated as a carry forward product and will be regulated exclusively as a derivatives contract. "

The majority view at that time preferred the carry forward product on the ground that the market would find that product easier to understand and use. A year later when SEBI began working on moving the entire market to rolling settlement, the view on this had changed. The developments in the cash and derivative markets during 2000 led to a view that carry forward system may not be any easier to understand and use than a single stock future. The superior risk containment model for derivatives swayed the thinking of the

1 This list is derived from Table 8 in Lascelles, D. (2002), Single stock futures, the ultimate derivative", Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, Paper No 52, February 2002, available online at http://www.liffe.com/products/equities/publications/csfi-ssf.pdf

2 "Report of the Committee on Carry Forward under Rolling Settlements", Securities and Exchange Board of India, January 2000.

Committee and led to a recommendation to abolish carry forward completely and replace it with single stock futures.  

Accordingly all deferral products like the carry forward system, ALBM and BLESS were abolished in July 2001. Stock futures started trading in November 2001. Thereafter, there has been a continuing debate on single stock futures in the press and elsewhere. In December 2001, the ACD discussed a note from former office bearers of the BSE stating that the regulatory regime for single stock futures was more liberal than that for the erstwhile carry forward system as well as that for the cash market. In its meeting in August 2002, the ACD’s attention was drawn to several press reports making similar arguments.

The ACD therefore considers it necessary to explain why the regulatory regimes for single stock futures and for the carry forward system are so radically different particularly in relation to position limits and margins. Further discussion of risk containment systems in derivatives is presented in 4 below

While institutions were prohibited by regulation from participating in the carry forward system, the derivatives markets are expected to have large institutional participation 4 . A market open to institutional trading cannot have arbitrary monetary limits on the size of individual trades or positions of the kind that existed in the carry forward market. For example, a large mutual fund that wants to hedge its exposure to a large stock might need to take a position of a billion rupees or more in the derivative markets. The position limits in single stock futures are therefore more complex:

• The aggregate positions of all players in the market put together in a single stock cannot exceed 10% of the free float of that stock. There was no such limit at all in the carry forward market and it was possible for total positions to be very large in relation to the free float particularly for small stocks. There have been occasions in the past year where this aggregate limit was approached and the exchanges took corrective action to prevent it from being breached.
• The aggregate positions cannot also exceed 30 times the average number of shares traded daily, during the previous calendar month, in the cash segment. This further limits the aggregate positions for less liquid stocks. 

3 "Report of the Committee on Deferral Products under Rolling Settlements", Securities and Exchange Board of India, April 2001.

4 India and Korea are perhaps the only exceptions to a global tendency for derivative markets to be dominated by institutional players. In India also institutional participation is expected to grow in future with increased clarity in the regulatory regime that applies to them..6

• No single client is allowed to take a position exceeding 1% of the free float of that stock. Except for the top rung of stocks with very large market capitalization, this position limit is quite modest. The carry forward system did not have any such limit at all as it applied limits only at the broker level rather than the client level. A single client could take large positions by operating through several brokers.
• To reduce concentration risk, no broker should account for a large fraction of the positions in any stock. An individual broker is not allowed to account for more than 7.5% of the aggregate positions in any stock. But there has to be an exception where the aggregate position itself is quite small. The first trade that is done on any stock would automatically give the two trading brokers a 50% share of the aggregate positions. To allow the initial trades to be executed to build the positions up to a reasonable size, a broker is allowed to have a position of up to Rs 0.5 billion even if that accounts for more than 7.5% of the aggregate positions. This limit is much bigger than it was in the carry forward system. The principal reason is that the carry forward system did not have limits at the customer level and had to impose tighter limits at the broker level. A second reason is that now the broker could be dealing for a number of large institutions and the limits that applied to the carry forward system would be totally inappropriate. Particularly in the context of the recommendation regarding extending stock derivatives to a larger number of stocks (see 3.3 below), the Committee is of the view that the Rs 0.5 billion limit would be too high for smaller stocks. The majority view of the Committee is that the member wise position limit should be as follows:

o 20% of the market wide position limit in the stock. where the market wide position limit is less than or equal to Rs 2.5 billion. This would ensure that when the open interest in the scrip is large (close to the market wide limit) it is distributed over at least five members with no member holding more than a fifth of the open interest.

o Rs 0.5 billion plus 7.5% of the excess of the market wide position limit over Rs 2.5 billion where the market wide position limit exceeds Rs 2.5 billion. This would mean that the larger the stock, the larger the number of members over whom a large open interest (close to the market wide limit) would have to be distributed. For example, if a stock has a market wide position limit of Rs 15 billion, each member would be limited to less than one-tenth of this.

The majority view of the Committee is that taken in totality the position limits in single stock futures (modified as above) are more stringent and effective than they were in the carry forward system.

Mr. Tahir and Mr. Vaidyanath do not agree with the majority view on member wise position limits and are of the view that the trading member position limit ought to be reduced. Mr. Tahir’s view is that:.

"The position limit of Rs 0.5 billion (more than Rs 0.5 billion in certain situations) per broker per scrip per exchange in respect of individual stock futures seems to be on the high side and therefore risky. Apparently, the limit has no relationship with the capital of a broker. The above limit of Rs 0.5 billion may be appropriately brought down. 

No aggregate position limit seems to have been envisaged for all the scrips taken together. Theoretically, this might lead to building up of huge positions (Rs 0.5 billion x Number of scrips x Number of exchanges) by individual brokers without reference to their capital. An aggregate position limit for each member for all stocks put together may be introduced.

In due course, an aggregate limit per member in both the segments (cash and derivatives) put together and an aggregate limit per member for both the stock exchanges put together may be thought of."

Mr. Vaidyanath is of the view that:

"The statement is made in the report ‘A market open to institutional trading cannot have arbitrary monetary limits on the size of individual trades or positions of the kind that existed in the carry forward market.’

The carry forward system had limits per broker (per weekly settlement) and there existed no client wise limits on the size of the individual trades or position. The system had in place a broker wise limit and a stringent limit for each scrip, which can be more easily monitored and regulated by the exchanges. Although we have a client wise limits in the derivatives segment the same cannot be a justification for higher broker wise position limits. Monitoring of client wise positions across several brokers is an area of concern from the risk management perspective.

The statement that in the carry forward system a single client could take large positions by operating through several brokers in different names would be as much true for the derivatives market.

A member wise position limits does not affect institutional participation. A statement is made that lower position limits on Trading Members would act as a hindrance for the large Institutional participation. The trades done by any institution gets transferred online to a Custodian Clearing Member. It therefore falls outside the purview of the trading member wise position limits Thus a lower broker wise position limits does not act as a hindrance for an Institution to take a large position.

It would be pertinent to mention that on the regulatory side the exchange has powers to regulate the member brokers and not over their clients.

Currently there exists a cap on the maximum amount of business that an institution / mutual Fund can put through a single broking entity. The limit is around 5% of the total turnover of the mutual fund or institution. It would be pertinent to mention that such limits also exist in respect of transactions in government securities that are undertaken by various banks and financial institutions 

Diversification of positions across scrips and members is essential as an important tool for risk reduction and better risk management. For encouraging institutional participation a differential treatment could be considered. A higher limit of Rs 0.5 billion could probably have been justified in the initial stages for the development of the derivatives market in India. However, currently there exists a need to encourage for proliferation across scrips and members.

There is a very strong need to take a fresh look at the member wise position limits. A lower limit will definitely not act as hindrance for institutional participation as explained earlier. However a lower limit with the stringent onus on the exchanges in respect of monitoring the same will ensure wider and broader participation concomitant with reduction of risk. A lower limit also acts as a strong deterrent for client manipulations. It should also be borne in mind that the exchanges have regulatory powers over the brokers and have no jurisdiction over the clients of member brokers.

With the limits proposed in the draft report a trading member without any net worth criteria can take positions across scrips up to Rs 9 billion in each exchange in the equity derivatives contracts. A trading member can take a position of Rs 0.5 billion in an underlying with an actual outflow of just Rs 15 million, offering a high degree of leverage.

It is important to note that currently the risk management systems deployed by the exchanges for margin computation is based on VAR. However, VAR as a means of risk cover addresses volatility and not the risk arising out of concentration of position. Historically, it is observed that it is concentration scrip wise or member wise which has caused market turbulence.

The Exchange appreciates the norm of market wide limits at 10% of the free float of the stock. However, in respect of the broker wise position limits it is suggested that we have a scrip wise limit and an overall cap in respect of the position across various equity based derivatives contracts. The proposed limits are as under

• Scrip wise limit (for equity based derivatives contracts): Up to Market Wide Open Interest of Rs 0.5 billion the limit applicable is proposed at Rs 50 million. When Market Wide Open Interest crosses Rs 0.5 billion, the limit applicable is proposed as the lower of 10% of the Market Wide Open Interest or Rs 200 million.
• Overall member wise limits across all equity based derivatives contracts: It is proposed that we fix a limit of Rs 0.75 billion."

Prof. Varma on the other hand wishes to place on record his strong support for the majority view that member level position limits should be linked to the market wide limits and his strong opposition to the minority view that there should be an absolute monetary limit. His view is that:

"Position limits are designed to deal with market integrity and not with risk containment. Historically, there was an unfortunate tendency in the erstwhile deferral products to view position limits as a substitute for sound risk management. It is important to ensure that this tendency is not imported into the derivatives markets. When position limits are seen as a market integrity issue, it is evident that they have nothing to do with capital adequacy. (The threat to market integrity is, if anything, higher when a highly capitalized entity takes a large position.) 

It is for this reason that the position limit is applied at the trading member level rather than the clearing member level while most of the risk management is applied at the clearing member level. 

For the same reason, it does not make sense to have a position limit on the position of a member aggregated across all scrips. The threat to market integrity arises when there is a large position in a single scrip and not when a large aggregate position is composed of small positions in several scrips.

Mr. Vaidyanath asserts that ‘The trades done by any institution gets transferred online to a Custodian Clearing Member. It therefore falls outside the purview of the trading member wise position limits’. From a market integrity point of view, this practice, if it does prevail, is absolutely unacceptable and highly pernicious. Global experience highlights instances where large, well capitalized and highly regulated entities have been at the very forefront of alleged or attempted market manipulation in financial derivative markets. There is absolutely no justification for excluding the institutional trades from the purview of member wise position limits. If any exchange is doing so on its own, it must stop the practice forthwith and if SEBI itself has permitted or condoned this relaxation, it must act quickly to withdraw the relaxation."

The minimum margins in the carry forward system were only 10%. This was beefed up by a complex tier of concentration and volatility margins as well as ad hoc margins. The Value at Risk (VaR) based margins in the derivative markets automatically and dynamically adjust the margins to the risk characteristics of the stock. There have been occasions where the margins on single stock futures have reached 57%. At the same time, the margins for low volatility stocks are much lower.

The margins in the derivative market are collected up front. The margin is paid before the trade is executed. This is a level of protection that never existed in the carry forward system and does not exist in the cash market even today. Similarly, the mark to market losses and other margin calls that arise every day have to be paid before trading begins the next day unlike in the cash market where it is paid a day later. Thus in the cash segment, the exchange is exposed to the price risk for twice as long as it is in the derivatives segment. The differences in margin collection dates are the principal reasons for the difference in margin levels between the two segments. If the cash segment could also migrate to the derivative market practices, it should be possible to harmonize the margin levels between the two markets.

The speedy collection of margins as well as its high degree of responsiveness to market conditions makes the derivative markets considerably safer than the erstwhile carry forward system.

3.3 Eligibility Requirements

Globally, the choice of stocks on which derivative contracts (stock futures or stock options) are traded is left to the exchanges. However, when the decision to introduce stock options in India was taken, the Indian markets were just emerging from the acute market turbulence of March-April 2001. Under these conditions, it was thought fit to limit the list of stocks to a small number where the threat of market manipulation was low and where there were no significant risk containment issues. Large cap, well traded stocks with a large free float were chosen to limit the possibility of market manipulation. In the backdrop of the intense market turbulence that had been witnessed in March 2001, it was also decided to exclude highly volatile stocks. The following criteria were therefore adopted:

• Stock should figure in the list of top 200 scrips, on the basis of average market capitalization, during the last six months and average free float market capitalization should not be less than Rs. 7.5 billion. and
• Stock should appear in the list of top 200 scrips, based on the average daily volume, during the last six months. Further, average daily volume should not be less than Rs. 50 million in the underlying cash market; and
• Stock should be traded at least on 90% of the trading days, during the last six months; and
• Non promoters holding in the company should be at least 30%; and
• Ratio of daily volatility of the stock vis-à-vis daily volatility of index should not be more than 4, at any time during the previous six months.

These criteria were intended to be highly restrictive under the presumption that they would be reviewed after six months with a view to expanding the list.

The ACD has revisited the issue of eligibility criteria several times during the last few months and come to the conclusion that SEBI should now lay down only broad eligibility criteria and the Exchanges should be free to decide on the stocks and indices on which futures and options could be permitted 5 . The committee took into account the concern that the competitive dynamics of the Indian markets may push exchanges to choose low quality stocks and that this may impact the safety and integrity of the markets. The new broad eligibility criteria should therefore focus on the issues of risk containment and manipulability. Manipulability in turn is related to the liquidity of the stock as well as its size (market capitalization). Risk containment is also partly related to liquidity. At the same time, the ACD is conscious of the need to permit derivative contracts on a wider range of stocks. The Indian equity market suffers from a serious problem, in the form of a severe dropoff in liquidity when we go from the largest stocks to the second- and third-tier stocks. To the extent that a larger set of stocks have trading of stock options and futures, the universe of ‘highly liquid’ stocks is likely to become larger.

Hence, we need a balance between the goal of improving broad-based liquidity of the market, and the risk of suffering an episode of market misconduct involving derivatives on a highly illiquid underlying.

The ACD was of the view that the order book snapshots contain a lot of valuable information about the liquidity and manipulability of the stock, and requested the NSE and BSE to carry out an empirical study in this regard. Accordingly, the NSE presented the results of an exercise that looked at four daily snapshots of the order book in the past six months. Based on these snapshots, they computed the order size (value) required to cause a change in the stock price equal to one-quarter of a standard deviation. This is referred to below as the quarter-sigma order size. The NSE also presented data on impact costs for various order sizes on the basis of the same snapshots.

The ACD believes that the impact cost provides a good measure of liquidity while the quarter-sigma order size is a useful direct measure of the manipulability of the stock.

On the basis of this empirical study and on the basis of extensive discussions, the ACD recommends the following broad eligibility criteria:

• The stock should be among the top 500 stocks in terms of market capitalisation and average daily volumes.
• The median quarter-sigma order size over the last six months should be at least Rs 0.5 million.

The stocks that meet the above broad eligibility criteria would include some that are less liquid or more volatile or smaller (in terms of market capitalization) than the current list of 31 stocks on which derivatives are traded. To deal with these stocks, the committee proposes some changes in the risk containment system:

5 The role of SEBI in approving derivative contracts under paragraph 4.10 of the LCGC report is discussed later in this section.

• If a stock is illiquid, the exchange may not able to close out a position on the same day as assumed in the VaR calculations. To deal with close-out risk, the margins need to be adjusted to account for the longer close-out time (say three days). Accordingly if the mean value of the impact cost (for an order size of Rs. 0.5 million) exceeds 1%, the price scanning range would be scaled up by the square root of three ( 73 . 1 3 » ) to cover the close-out risk. Scaling up the price scanning range scales up the margins for futures by the same ratio, while margins for options are impacted in a non linear fashion.
• As far as volatility is concerned, there is no problem with the VaR computations themselves as they are based on stock specific volatility. The only problem is regarding the second line of defence (the exposure limit) and this problem is easily addressed by linking that also to the volatility of the underlying stock. The second line of defence is currently set at 5%. This would be changed to the higher of 5% or 1.5 standard deviations. Accordingly, the exchanges would be required to ensure that for a particular stock, the higher of 5% or 1.5 standard deviations times the notional value of gross open position in futures and option contracts on that particular stock is collected /adjusted from the liquid net worth of a member on a real time basis. The rationale for the multiplier of 1.5 is explained in 4.1 below.
• As far as small cap stocks are concerned, there are no problems regarding the position limits that are stated in terms of market cap or trading volume. The only problem would have been with the absolute amount of Rs 0.5 billion that is currently used in the definition of the member level position limit. However, as discussed in 3.2.2 above, the majority view of the committee recommends that this limit be linked to the market wide position limit.

The universe of eligible stocks would vary from month to month as the impact cost and the quarter-sigma order size are calculated every month on a rolling basis considering the previous six months. It is therefore necessary to lay down the procedure for introducing and dropping stocks:

• Options and futures contracts may be introduced on new stocks when they meet the eligibility criteria. Mr. Vaidyanath is of the view that contracts should be introduced on new stocks only when they meet the eligibility criteria for three months in succession.
• If a stock fails to meet the aforesaid eligibility criteria for three months consecutively then no fresh month contracts should be issued on that stock. However, the existing unexpired contracts may be permitted to trade till expiry and new strikes may also be introduced in the existing contract months.
• However, the Exchanges should be empowered to compulsorily close out all derivative contract positions in a particular underlying when that underlying has ceased to satisfy the new eligibility criteria and the exchanges are of the view that continuance of derivative contracts on these stocks would pose a threat to market integrity and safety.
• If the impact cost for a stock moves from less than or equal to 1% to more than 1%, the price scan range in such stock should be scaled up by 3 and the scaling should be dropped when the impact cost drops to 1% or below. Such changes should be applicable on all existing open position in the underlying from a pre specified date.
• For the purpose of computing 1.5 standard deviations, the standard deviation of the daily logarithmic returns of prices in the scrip during the last six months would be computed. This value would be applicable for a month and would be re-calculated at the end of the month by once again taking price data on a rolling basis for the past six months.

The Committee would like to lay down some guidelines on the actual computation of impact cost and quarter sigma order size:

• Impact cost and the quarter sigma order size should be calculated by taking four snapshots in a day from the order book in the past six months. These four snapshots should be at times randomly chosen from within four fixed ten-minute windows spread through the day. The Exchanges should work together and use a common methodology for carrying out the calculations. Further, for a stock, lowest impact cost across any exchange in India would be considered.
• The details of calculation methodology and relevant data should be made available to the public at large through the web sites of the exchanges. 

The committee feels that when an unlisted company come out with a large initial public offering (IPO), it may be desirable to have derivative contracts trade on these stocks from the very first day of their listing to assist in efficient price discovery. The committee therefore proposes that in such cases if net public offer in the IPO is greater than or equal to Rs 5 billion then the exchanges may consider introducing stock options and stock futures contracts on such stocks at the time of their listing in the cash market. In this regard the exchanges may submit their proposal to SEBI for approval on a case by case basis. As regard the risk containment measures, the price scan range could be a multiple of the volatility indices. Subsequently, after sometime the volatility and the impact cost of the underlying stock could be used when price and order book data is available.

The recommendation that SEBI should only lay down the broad eligibility criteria for stock derivatives needs to be reconciled with the role of SEBI in approving derivative contracts under paragraph 4.10 of the LCGC report:

"The Committee suggests that before starting trading in a new derivatives product, the derivatives exchange should submit the proposal for SEBI's approval, giving (a) full details of the proposed derivatives contract to be traded (b) the economic purposes it is intended to serve (c) its likely contribution to the market's development and (d) the safeguards incorporated to ensure protection of investors/clients and fair trading. SEBI officers should be in a position to provide effective supervision and constructive guidance in this regard."

Properly interpreted, there is no contradiction here. What is being said in this report is that SEBI should take a view that stock futures and options contracts on stocks meeting the broad eligibility criteria would normally meet the tests laid down in paragraph 4.10 of the LCGC report and it would not be necessary for SEBI to apply its mind ab initio to each such contract that is proposed by an exchange. However, SEBI would retain the right under exceptional situations to deny permission for a contract that meets the eligibility conditions if it has particular reason to believe that clause (d) of paragraph 4.10 would not be met in that particular case.

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